IRIN Special - A question of recognition Part 2

The diaspora constituency There has been minimal international and humanitarian engagement in Somalia and Somaliland over the last few years, although Somaliland has received more attention as a stable and developing territory. With the link to the outside world effectively down, the case for Somaliland independence has often been heard most vocally from the diaspora through the Internet. The existence of Somali diaspora groups is a direct consequence of the humanitarian disasters in Somalia and Somaliland in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when hundreds of thousands fled abroad. Unwilling to accept a life of exiled silence, the groups have continued to perform an active role through remittances, which is a cultural obligation. Direct economic participation has given entitlement to a strong and vocal political participation, facilitated in the late 1990s by new technology. According to Somalia academic I.M.Lewis, “hundreds of essentially clan-based web-sites flourish and compete for attention with differently slanted versions of the news from home... Radio, telephones and the Internet combine elements of orality and literacy in way that appeals strongly to Somalis.” (‘Why the warlords won’: I.M.Lewis, ‘The Times Literary Supplement’ 8 June 2001) For the Somaliland diaspora, this has translated into a no-holds-barred campaign for independence. Remittances to the “motherland” has been a serious investment to families struggling to survive in Europe and North America. A pro-independence Isaq population is particularly strong in the Britain, where effective pressure has been put on British MPs to take an active interest in Somaliland - despite the fact official government policy regarding the former colony reflects the indifference of other members of the European Union. The most assertive Somaliland diaspora group is the Somaliland Forum, which has run a relentless campaign for independence. The campaign has concentrated primarily on direct petitioning of politicians and international organisations, as well as monitoring media output. The fact that the Somaliland Forum financed the travel and accommodation of international observers at the referendum has set it apart from the many other Somali diaspora groups. Characterised more by information intimidation and personal criticism than by diplomatic persuasion, the diaspora constituency is as much a political liability as an asset. It is an essential - but physically absent - constituency over which the Somaliland leadership exercises no control. The humanitarian approach Somaliland’s other main source of international contact has been through aid. Although humanitarian assistance has been minimal in Somalia and Somaliland since the collapse of the central government, Somaliland has received comparatively more attention and funds as a more stable and developed territory. “We have dealt with them differently, and they behave with us as if they are an international government,” said one humanitarian source. Agencies have to work with local counterparts, and the administration takes on national functions, like developing a school curriculum. “We treat them like a federal government,” the source said. But despite attempts, Somaliland was unable to persuade international financial institutions, like the World Bank, to devise a method of dealing with it. “After a certain point, you can’t go any further. You need recognition,” said one Somaliland politician. Aid budgets for Somalia have been shrinking dramatically since the massive military-led humanitarian intervention in 1992. The European Commission (EC - Somalia’s largest donor) says that more funds are spent in Somaliland than other parts of the country. This is primarily due to the fact that Somaliland has achieved stability making longer rehabilitation and development projects possible. Like many other donors, the EC has been limited in its dealings with the chronic emergency in Mogadishu, and has preferred to put money into the areas in which the separate regional administrations function. “Somaliland is about 10 years ahead of the rest of Somalia right now,” one humanitarian source insisted; “Puntland is about five.” This so-called “building blocks” approach was greatly encouraged up until very recently, when the new central authority was elected in Djibouti (see IRIN SOMALIA: Are “building blocks” the solution? http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/somalia/19990719.htm). However, the regional blocks which were effectively rewarded for pursuing separate development faced criticism for it in 2000, after the election of the TNG. A new pressure was on to unite with the Mogadishu-based authority. This may be one of the factors that prompted Egal to hold the referendum with some urgency, as there was concern in both Somaliland and Puntland that resources would be redirected to Mogadishu. It was certainly the case that the humanitarian community had begun to look south again, even if very cautiously. In a statement released soon after the TNG had established itself in Mogadishu, the UN humanitarian office tried to calm these suspicions by announcing that the new focus would not detract from already established programmes, and that all administrations would be given support. There was no doubt that the arrival of the TNG had an impact on the campaign for independence, however. Somaliland had survived without recognition in the absence of a recognised Somali government, but “a government in the south, with the legal and financial advantages it implies, could have serious implications for Somaliland.... Somaliland’s best ‘defence’ is recognition - in other words that the Mogadishu-based government is not sovereign in the north,” said one Somali political source. Recognising Somaliland’s needs Ironically, debates over the issue of international recognition have been associated as much with the new authority in Mogadishu as with Somaliland. When the TNG was elected by clan representatives and civil society groups in Djibouti, it was considered by many observers as a milestone in the peace process after a decade without a central authority. “The TNG was seen as the most genuine national process in the last 10 years, and came up with something representative... it is the only body left today in Somalia with representation from all clans,” said one Western source. Newly elected President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan thereafter took the Somalia seat at the UN, the Arab League, attended the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development summit, and most recently, re-took Somalia’s seat at the OAU summit in Lusaka, July 2001. “There is international recognition, but it is minimal... we are still at the stage of looking out for signs that regional states have officially, in writing, recognised the TNG,” said a diplomatic source. Critics of the TNG have pointed out that one of the criteria for a recognised government is territorial control, which the TNG has yet to achieve. According to international law, four main legal criteria for statehood are a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. It is up to the TNG to prove itself a genuine government; international recognition will not ultimately perform this function. In the case of Somaliland, no states have been willing to show formal recognition, because it is attempting to bring a new state into existence - rather than setting up a new administration in an existing state with which the international community may chose to establish diplomatic relations. “The common position of the international community has been one of resistance to the creation of new states to avoid setting a precedent that would lead to further secessionist movements and potential regional instability,” an expert in international law said. That position is likely to remain regarding Somaliland, whereas in the case of the TNG “it will prove difficult to identify a specific moment in time when a new national government becomes recognised as holding sovereignty of Somalia, as it will need time to establish its presence in-county and extend effective administration over its territory”, the expert said. For Somaliland, the closest it has got to recognition is in being treated as de facto independent by neighbouring Ethiopia - which has accepted Somaliland passports, and recently initiated twice-weekly flights by Ethiopian Airlines, and has discussed banking arrangements with the administration. But regional observers pose it is extremely unlikely that Ethiopia would go as far as extending formal recognition, as it would not want to undermine options in the south. This has recently been demonstrated by improved relations between Ethiopia and the TNG, and the continued role of Ethiopia in Somali peace talks. Somaliland passports have also been accepted in Italy, in the context of visiting delegations of Somaliland ministers. Italy, however, is seen as being strongly opposed to Somaliland independence because of its colonial attachment to a united Somalia. Britain is considered “broadly supportive” of the current Somaliland administration, but maintains “the status quo”, said one Western political source. The rest of the European Union is “much more hostile”, the source told IRIN. According to a Western political source, the French and Italians are particularly suspicious that London might seek to re-establish Somaliland. Britain, however, will also be influenced by US policy in the region. Over the last decade, the US sees reason to support a stable, central authority in a country it fears is vulnerable to the dangers of extremism and Islamisation. Egypt and the Arab states have always pushed for re-establishing a united Somalia, and Saudi Arabia has been one of the most generous backers of the TNG. “One of the few things the ever-squabbling Arab nations have in common is their strong support for a united Somalia,” said one regional expert. Somalia is a member of the Arab League. The key to serious canvassing for recognition would lie in gaining full support from Africa and the Arab world, the source said. African states would be extremely reluctant to bestow acceptance on Somaliland because of the fear of disintegration of less homogeneous nations. Eritrea, ironically, is one of those least likely to extend recognition. Eritrean diplomat Temedhin Temariam said Eritrea would not want to be portrayed as working for secessionism, and “we are as conservative on the issue [of Somaliland independence] as any other state”. However, almost all observers agree that if the south continued to fail, there would be reason in the future to reconsider the position on Somaliland. Absence of formal recognition as a state does not mean a lack of recognition for other achievements, like stability and administration. In a legal briefing on international recognition issues to the UN, one expert pointed out that under certain circumstances “the UN is in a position to maintain contact with non-recognised political entities within a state, even when a recognised government exists”. The example used is Sudan, where the UN maintains relations with southern factions. The referendum is “clearly not an internationally recognised referendum, and the outcome has no validity in the international community, but many will nevertheless take note of the message coming from the people of Somaliland”, said David Stephen, UN Special Representative for Somalia. Temedhin Temariam warns that it would be wrong for the international community to ignore developments in Somaliland because of a preoccupation with the issue of independence. “From a purely legal point of view, the vote for independence may not be acceptable, but in terms of what is in the hearts of the Somalilanders, it is very important to listen,” Temedhin said. “Somaliland is trying to succeed as a smaller, working entity... it is very important that the world should not deny them recognition in terms of working with them, and providing help to ameliorate their situation. Unity and common ground can come later.”